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Council, Derby, UKRoadworks and street works can be highly disruptive, expensive and deleterious to highway structures and
infrastructure planning, yet these activities must take place if modern societies are to continue to function. In helping to
strike this balance, this study investigates the public policy landscape of highway excavation management in England,
UK. Semi-structured interviews with industry stakeholders highlighted the complexity of the industry and revealed that
a number of issues compromise effective management. Principal problems included street authorities failing to take
enough ownership of the coordination process, highway legislation not encouraging joint working due to inherent
challenges arising from reinstatement guarantees and entrenched attitudes and adversarial practices in the construction
industry encouraging silo working. Key recommendations include amending highway legislation to support and
recognise multiagency working and street authorities undertaking reinstatements on behalf of undertakers, thus
helping to reduce fragmentation and discharge undertakers of onerous guarantees that contribute to silo working.Introduction
An estimated 1·5 million utility excavation works (street works) with
a direct construction cost of around £1·5 billion were estimated to
occur in the UK annually in 2008 by Parker (2008). The Asphalt
Industry Alliance (AIA, 2013) estimated 1·9 million excavations in
2014, increasing to 2·2 million in 2015. Unsurprisingly, the volume
of street works in urban areas is considered to have a negative impact
on the road network, causing disruption and premature deterioration
(House of Commons, 2011), compromise the street scene (Goodwin,
2005; House of Commons, 2011) and increase significantly social,
economic and environmental costs (Jordan et al., 2009; Parker,
2008). The social costs of utility works are estimated to be around
£5·5 billion annually, of which £5·1 billion is road user delays alone
(McMahon et al., 2005). Comparative figures for highway works
(roadworks) are not readily available but are likely to be similarly
significant. Such impacts, coupled with yearly increases in
excavation activity (Goodwin, 2005) warrant better highway
management to reduce highway excavations and their associated
impacts. Under the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (1991)
‘roadworks’ are undertaken by highway authorities (HAs) to
maintain, rehabilitate and reconstruct highways. ‘Street works’ are
undertaken to install, inspect, maintain, repair or replace utility
apparatus in the highway by utility companies. However, for the
purpose of this paper, street works will be used to represent both
terms given that the public are affected in the same way.
This paper aims to provide the sector’s views about street work
performance in order to identify where improvements can be made.
The paper comprises a literature review providing a state of the art ofstreet work management, an outline of the methods used to perform
this study, findings from the study, a discussion and conclusions with
recommendations to help improve the management of street works.
Literature review
Conventionally, utility apparatus is housed underground in
modern densely populated urban cities in the UK, USA, China
and Japan (Jaw and Hashim, 2013). In order to manage street
work activity, technologically and policy-based approaches are
typically used (Wilde et al., 2003).
Technologically based approaches
Open-cut excavations, also known as trenching, have been in
operation for around 200 years. Trenching entails cutting and
excavating the ground to place utility apparatus underground
(Asphalt Industry Alliance, 2013). Trenching is considered
disruptive and expensive and having high social costs (Lepert and
Brillet, 2009). An alternative to trenching is the use of trenchless
technologies, necessitating little or no use of open-cut trenching.
Trenchless methods include, among others, horizontal directional
drilling, microtunnelling, pipe jacking, auger boring, pipe bursting
and robotic spot repairs, which are being used extensively
internationally. Trenchless technologies can require greater capital
outlay than open-cut methods and thus discourage wider take-up
(Ariaratnam et al., 2014; Shukla and Karki, 2013). Utility assets
can also be stored in tunnel systems known interchangeably as
multiutility tunnels, utility corridors and pipe subways. These
tunnels can house single or multiple utilities within purpose-built
enclosures constructed for human entry; examples can be found in61
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al., 2009; URS, 2009). Tunnels negate the need to trench the
highway but are associated with relatively high initial capital
investment and long-term maintenance costs, making them
unattractive propositions for extensive use (Hunt et al., 2014).
Policy-based approaches
While street work policy has received relatively limited attention
in literature (Tseng et al., 2011), in practice, several schemes exist
around the world. For example permit schemes in the UK,
Singapore and New York enable regulatory authorities to issue
permits for works in the highway (Transport Research Laboratory,
2012). Further, lane rental schemes in London and Sydney enable
HAs to rent out highway lanes for specified periods (City of
Sydney, 2014; Department for Transport, 2012).
Examples of localised street works policy restrictions include the
following.
■ One-for-one lane replacement – Work promoters in Singapore
are required to provide a temporary lane for any lane lost to
street works (Land Transport Authority, 2014).
■ Work embargo – Any works involving a road closure are
generally restricted to a Sunday in Sydney. Singapore prohibits
peak hour working and Hong Kong prohibits works between
7 a.m. and 7 p.m. daily (City of Sydney, 2014; Land Transport
Authority, 2014; Transport Research Laboratory, 2012).
The literature review has established techniques used to manage
street works; however, a knowledge gap exists about stakeholders’
views of street work policy.
Method
This study was undertaken through conducting 28 semi-structured
interviews, whereby interviewees were given the flexibility to62
ed by [ LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY] on [01/08/16]. Copyright © ICE Puguide and expand discussions within set parameters (Bryman,
1988). Interviews were conducted in two stages. Stage 1 comprised
exploratory interviews focused around the following discussion
themes
(a) performance of street work management system
(b) factors affecting street work management
(c) the future of the street work industry.
Participant selection was initially targeted by using ‘snowball
sampling’ initiated by the Derby City Council as the sponsoring
organisation. Subsequently, ‘purposive sampling’ was used to
identify experts. Stage 1 involved 18 traffic management experts
from various government agencies and utility companies as well
as general managers. ‘Experts’ were considered as those with
interpretative and technical process orientated knowledge (Miles
and Huberman, 1994).
Stage 1 interviews provided a developed understanding, which
meant more defined questions could be asked in stage 2 as detailed
in Table 1. Here, ten interviews were undertaken comprising
government, regulatory and business/public representatives.
Purposive sampling was adopted to target appropriate expertise
from local authorities and the regulator (Flick, 2014). Expert
knowledge was not sought from business/public interviewees, as
this was not considered necessary. Table 2 provides a breakdown
of the interviewees.
Interview findings from both stages were analysed by using a
thematic analysis approach involving an iterative process of
reading, annotating and coding of data. Commonly occurring
themes were labelled and were then analysed, compared and
contrasted (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Interview findings were
subsequently blended with literature to place them in the context
of existing knowledge and provide a comprehensive study.Theme QuestionDesign of overall
processWhat is your understanding of the process of managing street works?
Who are your stakeholders and what challenges does their management present?
Do you work with others and how does this influence what you do?Performance How do you see the street work process performing generally?
What is the current method for measuring street work performance?
Does any incentives/penalties framework exist in your sector?Context What are the main issues, constraints and difficulties facing your stakeholders when faced with street
works?
What are the issues, constraints and difficulties of your organisation in the utility sector?
What do you consider is working well in street work management?Future What current trends are likely to influence the future of street works, and what will their impacts be?
What are the future challenges and opportunities for the roadwork and street work sector?
What recommendations would you make to improve the sector?Table 1. Design of stage 2 interviewsblishing, all rights reserved.
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This section discusses the interview findings and seeks to
corroborate them against existing literature where available. It
begins with describing the key players to aid understanding of the
industry. Subsequently, the interview findings are split into the
following themes: performance of street work management
processes; factors affecting street work management and future
challenges and opportunities; and further subthemes. To guide the
reader, the structure of the analysis is provided in Table 3. [ LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY] on [01/08/16]. Copyright © ICE PublishKey actors
This section identifies the key actors involved in the street work
management industry in England.
■ ‘Street authorities’ (SAs) are part of a council authority and
have a statutory duty to manage and coordinate roadwork and
street work activity on their road network.
■ HAs are part of a council authority with a statutory duty to
repair and maintain the fabric and structure of their highways.
■ ‘Statutory undertakers’ (SUs) are those involved with the
execution of works related to utility apparatus. They have a
statutory duty to make efforts ‘to co-operate with the street
authority and other undertakers’ to assist with the execution of
street works (New Roads and Street Works Act 1991, 1991).
■ ‘Regulators’ typically refers to financial regulators in this
study who closely monitor the monopoly utility industries of
water, electric and gas. Multiple regulators monitor other
industry activities and also the telecoms industry.
■ The ‘construction industry’ refers to the network of
contractors and subcontractors that the utility industry relies
on to deliver their physical works.
■ The ‘general public’ are consumers of utility services and
users of the highway.
Performance of street work management processes
This section discusses the performance of street work management
systems as identified by the interviewees. Findings have been
categorised into three main areas of performance, namely network
management performance, process performance and construction
performance. In order to rationalise interviewee comments,
discussions have been split into a number of constructionGroup Subgroup Interviewee
codesInterview
stage1 2Government Central NG1, NG2 ✓
Local LA2 ✓LA1, LA3–LA5 ✓
Regulator R1, R2 ✓
Utility Electric UE1–UE3 ✓Water UW1–UW4 ✓
Gas UG1–UG3 ✓
Telecoms UT1, UT2 ✓
Miscellaneous UM1, UM2 ✓
Industry
representativeUR1 ✓Business and Business B1, B2 ✓
public Public P1, P2 ✓Table 2. Breakdown of interviewees and codesThemes 4.2 Performance of street work
management4.3 Factors affecting street worksing, all rights reserv4.4 Practical
coordination barriersed.4.5 Future challenges
and opportunitiesSubthemes 4.2.1 Network management
End user satisfaction
4.2.2 Process performance
Quality
Functionality
4.2.3 Construction
performance
Efficiency
Quality
Costs4.3.1 Permit schemes
4.3.2 Regulatory structure
Regulation and timescales
Conflict in industry and
highway regulations
Commercial sensitivity in
the telecoms industry
4.3.3 Industry standards
Highway reinstatement
standards
HA as guarantor
4.3.4 Working relationships4.4.1 Scheduling
constraints
4.4.2 Physical
constraints4.5.1 Asset
management
4.5.2 Silo workingTable 3. Structure of interview findings63
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accordingly as follows
■ quality – the degree to which a street work system or process
satisfies the user’s needs
■ functionality – the degree to which a street works system or
process fulfils its intended function
■ efficiency – the minimal degree to which a system or process
expends time and effort
■ cost – the degree to which street work activity provides value
for money
■ end user satisfaction – the level of satisfaction of those who
ultimately experience street work operations or systems
Network management
Network management performance is concerned with the overground
impacts of street work activity, and, therefore, the feedback focused
on public impact.
End user satisfaction
Satisfaction levels were low because communication about street
works, particularly those directly affecting road users and
businesses, was considered unsatisfactory (R1, R2, P1, P2, B1,
B2). It was felt that ‘utilities should be held to account’ for the
negative social and financial impact they had (B1). Businesses felt
that street works were damaging, and, despite being significantly
affected, they had little influence on street work operations. Wong
et al. (2012) stressed that limited communication with the public
about construction projects can result in a negative image of
companies executing works, which should be avoided.
Process performance
Process performance is concerned with the operational element of
street works and focuses mainly on the interactions of SAs and
SUs. The interviewees generally discussed the quality and
functionality of the processes and collaborative/partnership
working. Collaborative working within this context means
coordinated multiagency working.
Quality
The undertakers felt that SAs compromised the effective
management of street works by failing to take ownership of the
coordination process and lacking the motivation to drive it,
despite this being their legal duty (UG1, UW2). Interviewee UG1
stated, ‘collaboration doesn’t happen unless local authorities make
it happen’. Interviewee NG2, a government agency, asserted the
SAs’ role: ‘it is incumbent on local authorities to coordinate and
not utilities’ The undertakers (UE3, UE2, UW2) expressed a
desire to work with others but found it hard to initiate multiutility
working because of the logistics of seeking and contacting other
undertakers. It is recognised that interorganisational collaboration
is intrinsically difficult due to the involvement of multiple actors
(Calamel et al., 2012; Johnson et al., 2010). SAs should therefore
seek to facilitate collaborative/coordinated working through taking
ownership of street work management, providing genuine64
ed by [ LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY] on [01/08/16]. Copyright © ICE Puleadership, vision, strategy and engaging organisational buy-in
(Hackman, 1998; Lu et al., 2007; Shea and Guzzo, 1987).
Functionality
The interviewees alluded to the statutory-prescribed coordination
meetings tending to be poorly planned, inefficient and superficial
(UM1, UM2). In fact, Engestrom et al. (1997) and Bishop et al.
(2009) found that coordinated working in the construction industry
tended to be scripted with little genuine collaborative effort. To
help address this, SAs should plan and manage coordination
meetings diligently to maximise potential multiagency working
opportunities. Further, the undertakers felt that SAs were not
interested in long-term coordination plans (UM1, UM2, UW2,
UW3). UW4 stated, ‘Local Authorities don’t have very long term
plans in comparison with utilities who may plan for 30 years’.
Awareness of long-term plans is particularly valuable for authorities
with long-term infrastructure management plans known as highway
asset management plans. Two key reasons may explain why SAS
may not have long-term plans.
■ HA budgets – Local government funds are awarded annually
and are no longer ring-fenced to highway maintenance; this
means shorter maintenance cycles, with no guarantee of
spending on highways. Further, austerity cuts have meant
reduced budgets and uncertainty over future spending
allocations (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012).
■ Elections cycles – Frequent elections can cause changing
political structures, again promoting short-term objectives
(Fenwick et al., 2003).
The allocation of HA budgets and election cycles are factors
outside of the control of the SA – changes would be required at
the central government level to address these issues in order to
have a positive impact on street works.
Construction performance
This section considers the interviewees’ views on construction
performance, which focuses on on-site operational issues and factors
including silo working, street work quality and financial penalties.
Efficiency
The interviewees generally accepted that undertakers sought to
work individually. Silo working was considered more convenient
than integrating work with others, which could undermine
individual goals and priorities. LA5 explained, ‘utilities are tied
into contractors who then sub-contract. Two contractors agreeing
to work together does not happen as companies want to maximise
their profits’. The construction industry is well documented as an
industry symptomatic of fragmentation through its processes,
procurement and working practices (Greenwood and Wu, 2012;
Xue et al., 2010) and driven by entrenched adversarial
relationships where there is no natural desire to work collectively
and for the common purpose (Wong et al., 2012). Further, the
construction industry workforce was considered a key party in
enabling/restraining advancement of street works (LA1, UG1, R1,blishing, all rights reserved.
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operatives; it’s difficult to change. The age profile of the
workforce is high; some have been there since pre-privatisation
when costs weren’t an issue. A change of mind-set is needed for
the old timers’ (R2). Ideally, construction firms should seek to
modernise culture by managing contractors through performance
measurement and management frameworks to evaluate, control
and improve performance (Xue et al., 2010). Carefully planned
communication and contractor management strategies would help
change behaviour and culture.
Quality
The quality of street work standards was considered as being
driven down by SAs who were seeking to minimise street works
durations: ‘operatives may spend less time on the quality of the
work to speed things up, which in the long run is not good’
(LA3). Indeed the HA and SA can be considered as having
‘adversarial duties’, insofar as the HA’s priority is highway
maintenance, which operationally disturbs the flow of traffic and
therefore conflicts with the SAs’ network management duty.
Therefore, in seeking to manage its duty, SAs may cause
undertakers to accelerate works, potentially causing substandard
works (notwithstanding prescribed standards), which could
undermine structural life and the HA’s statutory duty. The local
authority must therefore be mindful of both duties and balance
network management with high-quality highway structures.
Costs
The undertakers felt that SAs were using the New Roads and Street
Works Act 1991 (1991) to penalise undertakers unnecessarily
financially through section 74 (overstay) charges and fixed penalty
notices (UW1, UG1, UW2, UW3, UW4, UR1). Interviewee UW2
felt that the utility sector was being used to substitute local
authority austerity cuts, with UW4 remarking that ‘street works are
seen as a cash cow’. The regulator supported the undertakers’
concerns: ‘utilities feel that they can get penalties easily. They [SA]
see it as an opportunity for raising money’ (R2). In contrast, LA1
and LA3 expressed unapologetic views suggesting that financial
penalties were avoidable and often calculated: ‘it may be cheaper
for undertakers to receive a fine from us than the logistics of
stopping and starting works again on another date…. The
consequences of work promoters not following the rules are felt by
road users and businesses; the fines are minor compared to the cost
of disruption’ (LA3). Trust is an important component for
interorganisational working; however, an environment where parties
feel suspicion and mistrust is unlikely to support a conducive
environment for collaborative working (Hackman, 1998; Lu et al.,
2007; Patel et al., 2012; Shea and Guzzo, 1987; Shelbourn et al.,
2007).
Factors affecting street works
This section considers those factors that the interviewees
considered had an indirect impact on street work management,
namely the permit scheme, regulatory structure, industry standards
and working relationships. [ LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY] on [01/08/16]. Copyright © ICE PublishPermit schemes
The interviewees had mixed views about the permit scheme, a
relatively new approach in England which gives SAs greater
ability to control and direct works on the highway; the scheme is
chargeable to utility companies and free to HAs. Most of the
utility interviewees did not feel that the permit scheme was
justified or necessary. Interviewees UE1, UW2, UW3, UW4,
UR1, UM1 and UM2 felt that there was nothing within the new
enabling legislation (Traffic Management Act 2004, 2004) that
was not contained in the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991
(1991), with respondents 6, 7 and 8 stating that the key difference
was the ability to charge utilities to undertake works. The utilities
were also dissatisfied with the additional work generated by the
scheme, creating indirect costs (UW1, UG1, UW2, UW3, UW4,
UT2 and UR1). Further, interview UR1 felt that SAs did not
exercise parity and that HAs ‘got away’ with not applying for
permits. In contrast, respondents UE1, NG1 and NG2 felt that the
permit scheme had come about because of the local authorities’
failures to ‘coordinate’ street works and the utilities’ duties to ‘co-
operate’. Respondent UR1 suggested that both parties should
work together to remove the permit scheme.
The regulator acknowledged that SUs had complained that the
permit schemes were affecting productivity and were a greater
financial burden; however, the regulator saw this as an opportunity
to review their processes and make them more efficient (R1). The
regulator confirmed: ‘the Permit scheme has driven a behaviour
change in utility companies; they see it as a big issue. They now
pay more attention to planning street works; street works have
benefited and so has the general public. They have risen to the
challenge’. While there is some acknowledgement of the need for
the permit scheme, the SUs were generally opposed to the scheme
and did not consider it a value for money exercise; no literature
could be found on the empirical evaluation of the permit scheme
to corroborate this argument (with the exception of some grey
literature).
Regulatory structure
The undertakers reported allegiance to industry regulations and its
associated timescales, conflicts between highway legislation and
industry regulation and competitiveness affecting their commitment
to street work management. These discussions will be elaborated on
further.
Regulation and timescales
The telecoms industry reported to operating in a ‘free market’
motivated by fast facilitation of contractual commitments (UT2).
Conversely, water, electric and gas undertakers were a part of a
monopoly market subject to high levels of financial regulation.
Failure to meet regulator deadlines attracted fines and impacted on
profits and subsidies awarded. Regulators rewarded undertakers
for high customer service and efficient customer facilitation,
particularly in terms of faults and new connections (UW1, UG1,
UE2). The regulator (R2) reported that ‘the regulations constantly
require efficiency and demonstrating efficiency… we may not65
ing, all rights reserved.
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deliver works in a timely manner meant that the undertakers’
business goals often took precedence over street work
management. Conflicting goals and timescales can make
coordinated working difficult (Patel et al., 2012) further; delaying
works to synchronise with others can also lead to negative
financial expenses (Johnson et al., 2010). As the speed of service
delivery to customers was considered critical by all undertakers,
particularly in the case of small works such as connections, SAs
should direct coordination efforts on longer duration works,
namely ‘standard’ (3–10 d) and ‘major’ (over 10 d) works.
Conflict in industry regulation and highway regulation
Some interviewees reported significant ‘clashes’ between the
obligations of the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (1991)
and respective monopoly industry regulations (UE2, UM1, UG1,
UW1, UW2, UW3, UW4, LA1, LA4). Interviewee UE2
summarised: ‘neither regulation has any regard for the other’.
Interviewee UW1 revealed that sometimes these conflicts
compelled them to work against the New Roads and Street Works
Act 1991 (1991), which meant that they risked receiving small
fines by SAs, as opposed to being ‘fined millions’ by their
regulator. Working in conflict with street work legislation
requirements shows an unnecessary compulsion faced by
undertakers, which transposes into a lack of trust and openness
between parties, which is a significant barrier to effective
communication and thus effective joint working (Shelbourn et al.,
2007). The regulator (R1 and R2) expressed surprise about
perceived conflicts and advised that any specific conflicts brought
to their attention would be thoroughly investigated. NG1 and
NG2 proposed that permit schemes were solutions for any
perceived conflicts.
Commercial sensitivity in the telecoms industry
As part of operating in a free market, the telecoms industry
reported to be operating in a highly competitive industry with
high levels of secrecy to protect commercial dealings (UT1, UT2,
UR1). Unlike the monopoly industry, there was a distinct
hesitation about openly discussing works in the presence of
competitors to prevent theft of clients. Like the construction
industry, organisations working in the telecoms industry are profit
driven where a culture of secrecy is common practice (Bishop et
al., 2009). Trust is an important component for nurturing
collaborative working (Hashim, 2012; Shelbourn et al., 2007),
however, joint working with competitors is regarded as
‘adversarial collaboration’ (Patel et al., 2012). These issues appear
to be barriers in the telecoms sector which restrict sharing of
information, which in turn has the effect of reducing joint
working opportunities.
Industry standards
The interviewees felt that highway reinstatement standards and
HAs being lead work promoters had a significant impact on street
work management. These issues will be looked at further in the
next sections.66
ed by [ LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY] on [01/08/16]. Copyright © ICE PuHighway reinstatement standards
The reinstatement procedure requires work executors to reinstate
and subsequently guarantee reinstatements for a period of at least
2 years (Department of Transport, 2010); this guarantee period
was typically referred to as a ‘liability’ by undertakers (UE2,
UW1, UG1, UT1, UW2, UW3, UW4). Issues around the
guarantee period centre on the responsibilities of the ‘last noticer’.
Interviewee UG1 explained: ‘Collaboration is more of a problem
in terms of sharing liabilities as only one of the two or more
utilities can be the lead Notice provider – the lead organisation
has to take the most liability and there is reluctance as the
company doesn’t want to take liability for another utility’s
carelessness or mistakes’. The undertakers were more willing to
work together subject to legal contracts clarifying responsibilities,
although this was considered a time-consuming exercise (UT1,
UW1). Respondent UE2 stated, ‘there is no incentive and even a
reluctance to collaborate…. it is too risky’. Indeed section 70 of
the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (1991) places the
entire reinstatement onus on the executor, thus removing the
option to share works. It would be beneficial if the New Roads
and Street Works Act 1991 (1991) was amended to use
terminology that was supportive of and recognised multiagency
working. Different working cultures and practices make
interorganisational working difficult; thus, parties are motivated
by incentives to work together as opposed to risks (Calamel et al.,
2012; Patel et al., 2012), which the liability is seen as.
HA as guarantor
The undertakers proudly cited examples of participation in
multiagency working led by HAs as part of their highway
maintenance works. In such instances it is highly likely that the
HA would be the executor, reinstator and thus guarantor of works
(UE1, UG4, UW2, UW7, UW8). The undertakers showed a
distinct difference in attitude and enthusiasm to multiagency
working once the onus of the reinstatement guarantee had been
taken away by the HA (see ‘Highway reinstatement standards’).
Tapping into the undertakers’ willingness to work with HAs, the
HA could potentially carry out reinstatements on behalf of the
undertakers and discharge them of guarantor obligations at a cost.
This would encourage increased multiagency working and
encourage consistency in materials and standards across areas.
This will be similar to the predecessor legislation, Public Utilities
Street Works Act 1950 (1950), where SAs compulsorily
undertook all reinstatement works at a cost on behalf of the
undertakers. It would be important, however, to take into account
previous mistakes to ensure that those issues which led to the
original legislation being repealed are not repeated.
Working relationships
There was a great emphasis on the importance of good working
relationships between undertakers and SAs. UW1, UG1, UM1
and UM2 commented that they operated throughout the country
with various SAs and each had slightly different approaches to
managing street works. Frustratingly, these subtle differences
made it difficult for the undertakers to adopt a consistentblishing, all rights reserved.
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authorities were seen to be vital for successful partnership
working as confirmed by Hashim (2012). Respondents UG1,
UM1 and UM2 also felt that ‘people relationships’ were critical.
Interviewee UW1 stated, ‘some authorities are helpful, others are
very prescriptive which is usually not helpful’. The interviewee
referred to an SA that would accept communication in only
writing, which made it difficult to negotiate changes to planned
street works. Formal and informal communication through
meetings or discussions, as well as the ability to negotiate, is
regarded as ‘vital’ for collaborative working (Lu et al., 2007). To
assist with peer co-operation in negotiation, an argumentation-
based negotiation approach could be adopted to facilitate
discussion (see the paper by Sierra et al., 1998).
Practical coordination barriers
The interviewees discussed the working practicalities of joint
working. Their views cover two issues, namely scheduling and
physical constraints.
Scheduling constraints
The undertakers considered joint working to be resource intensive
(UE1, UG1, UW2). Respondent UE1 stated, ‘coordination takes a
lot of time, effort and planning’. Utilities in England are profit-
driven enterprises; therefore, they can be less inclined to spend
time on limited-value-adding activities. Further, entrenched
attitudes prevalent in the construction industry towards
maximising individual gains and profiteering can make
coordinated working ‘economically irrational’ (Bishop et al.,
2009) and therefore reinforce silo working. In addition, disparate
timing of works was considered a barrier to multiagency working,
‘… expectations are unrealistic; coordination involves logistics,
gangs and materials all to tie in’ (UW3). Similarly, UE2 felt that
‘… it would only work with seamless or consecutive working – it
doesn’t work with differing utilities having different regulator
timescales’. An available forum to plan and coordinate works
exists through coordination meetings; however, these meetings
have previously been described as ineffective (see ‘Process
performance’–‘Quality’).
Physical constraints
Interviewee UW1 stated that ‘trench sharing is not easy’. The
interviewee referred to guidelines set by the National Joint
Utilities Group which specify the sequence and depths of
underground apparatus, which were considered a barrier to trench
sharing. NG1 and NG2 referred to health and safety risks, with
UG1 corroborating: ‘it’s not usually practically possible for two
utilities to work simultaneously… logistics and safety of the job
come first; this can make collaboration very difficult’. While
trench sharing simultaneously may not always be appropriate due
to potential dangers, utilities may be able to reduce risk by
working sequentially. This area requires further research to fully
understand the risks and likelihood of incident, as well as the
impacts of different utilities working together. This can then be
advanced into creating a risk scale which could be used by [ LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY] on [01/08/16]. Copyright © ICE Publishundertakers to determine the differing levels of risk associated
with collaborating with other utility industries.
Future challenges and opportunities
In looking to the future, the interviewees identified asset
management and silo working as key issues likely to affect street
management.
Asset management
Key challenges were considered around utilities requiring greater
knowledge of the location of their assets (R1, R2). This issue is
prolific and is currently being addressed through the Mapping the
Underworld project (Rogers and Knight, 2014). Concerns were
also expressed about ageing assets; R1 stated, ‘buried assets are
deteriorating, how do you deal with infrastructure that is over 100
years old?’ Despite this concern, the interviewees were optimistic
about the rapid development of technologies to help prolong
highway and utility asset life (LA1, LA3, LA4, R1, R2). LA4 and
LA5 expressed concerns that repeatedly cutting the highway
compromised the life of highway infrastructure and questioned
whether a 2-year guarantee period was enough or if utilities
should be subject to whole life charges. Indeed, a charge structure
has been developed for trenching in the highway (Jordan et al.,
2009; Latham et al., 2011), which SAs could use as an
opportunity and adopt.
Silo working
Fragmented working among the construction industry was
damaging, as it undermined coordinated working (LA1, LA4).
Non-local authority interviewees (P1, P2, B1, R1, R2) also desired
increased multiagency working to minimise the impact of street
works. A way of addressing this could be amending the New Roads
and Street Works Act 1991 (1991) to encourage multiagency
working by removing the reinstatement onus from the executer.
Indeed, the interviewees commented that the New Roads and Street
Works Act 1991 (1991) was complex legislation open to
interpretation (LA3, LA4, UM1, UE1): ‘if legislation was clear and
free from ambiguity then it would drive greater collaborative
working’ (LA4). LA5 also suggested adopting innovative ways of
working such as undertakers working from council offices, which
would afford undertakers more proactive consideration in street
work projects and thus increase multiagency working.
Conclusions
This research set out to provide an insight into the management of
the street work sector and provide the sector’s views on its
performance to identify where improvements can be made.
Principal findings from the research reveals issues on the
following.
■ Limited ownership of coordination process – Street works are
part of a complex industry with direct actors comprising SAs
and undertakers, with industry regulators and the construction
industry having a significant role and influence, albeit
indirectly. Non-local authority interviewees expressed firm67
ing, all rights reserved.
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Downloadexpectations that SAs should take greater ownership of the
management of the coordination of street works. Prescribed
coordination meetings were considered ineffective and
superficial.
■ Recommendation – SAs need to take more ownership and
lead by providing strategic vision and direction to enhance
street works management.■ Long construction supply chains – The interviewees felt that
the construction supply chain played a major role in hindering
the effective management and advancement of the street work
industry because of its entrenched attitudes, adversarial
practices and profiteering culture.
■ Recommendation – Undertakers should manage
contractors proactively through a performance
measurement and management framework to evaluate,
control and improve performance.■ Conflicts between industries – There was a perceived conflict
between timescales prescribed by the New Roads and Street
Works Act 1991 (1991) and industry regulations. In these
circumstances, undertakers tended to give greater priority to
utility industry timescales as they were driven by financial
rewards.
■ Recommendation – Any perceived conflicts should be
brought to the attention of Highways and Utilities
Committee UK to own, investigate and provide remedial
measures.■ Onerous reinstatement guarantees – The New Roads and
Street Works Act 1991 (1991) was not considered to
encourage undertakers to participate in joint working due to
the inherent challenges associated with reinstatement
guarantees placed on the primary executor of works.
■ Recommendation – The New Roads and Street Works Act
1991 (1991) should be amended to use terminology that is
supportive of and recognises multiagency working as
opposed to placing the single onus on the executer of
works.■ The HA as the primary executor – The undertakers showed
significantly greater willingness to participate in multiagency
working where the HA was the executor and guarantor of
works.
■ Recommendation – HAs should undertake reinstatement
works on behalf of undertakers at a cost and thus
discharge undertakers of the guarantee period by
becoming the guarantor of the reinstatement. This would
also help to encourage consistent reinstatement standards
throughout areas.68
ed by [ LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY] on [01/08/16]. Copyright © ICE Pu■ Future – Key future concerns were particularly expressed
around prolonging the life of highway and utility
infrastructure, with technological innovations and the adoption
of trenchless technologies and trench charging structures seen
as potential opportunities in mitigation. The contemporary
prevalent nature of silo working was also seen as an area
which would benefit if the New Roads and Street Works Act
1991 (1991) was amended.
■ Recommendation – SAs should work with their HAs to
adopt policies which champion longer highway structural
life such as increasingly adopting trenchless techniques
and trench charging.Overall, street works are expensive for the industry and the society
and need to be managed effectively. The significance of this study
is that it has identified some of the current problems facing the
industry which are impeding the optimal management and
efficiency of street work practices. Failure to consider and address
these issues will lead to sustained increases in street works, which
is an unsustainable scenario, particularly in the current climate of
rising street works, decreasing local authority budgets and
forecasted population and housing growth. This study contributes
to a limited body of literature in street work policy and is novel in
that it is the first time a comprehensive study of stakeholder
attitudes to street work management has been undertaken.
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